




Understanding SME Responses to 
Environmental Regulation​[1]​





Despite years exploring the issue, our understanding of how firms respond to regulation is far from complete (Gunningham et al. 2003). There are, of course, several explanations for this. One explanation relates to regulation itself, and how it has evolved. States seem no longer disposed nor perhaps capable of monopolising the regulatory function, while simultaneously new governance forms have emerged and regulatory responsibilities have duly become more dispersed across different social and economic actors (Hutter and Jones 2007; Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004; Grabosky 2013). To improve our understanding of how regulation works thus demands regular re-examination of how firms respond. Another explanation, with implications for the previous, is we are more aware that firms differ and that differences shape responses (Gunningham et al. 2005; Lynch-Wood and Williamson 2011; Neilson and Parker 2012). And so, we observe more approaches that are ‘regulatory’ and are more aware that firms respond differently to them.

This article presents data on the environmental practices and regulatory responses of 110 manufacturing small and medium enterprises (SMEs)​[2]​. The empirical data, which were gathered over a five year period (2004-2009), are drawn from three studies. Although each was an independent study, required to satisfy different outputs, they had a shared theme since each was focussed on SME environmental behaviour. This shared theme is our focus here. The data largely support previous studies by showing that regulation drives practice and behaviour. However, they also reveal differences across firms that affect responses to different regulatory instruments. Indeed, not only are there different groups of firms showing similar behaviour patterns, but further layers of difference exist within groups. We can therefore better understand organisational responses to regulation if we consider firms as groups (and subgroups) of organisations that have similar ‘capacities’ (e.g., resources, skills) and ‘orientations’ (e.g., attitudes) – the factors that constitute their receptive capacity. While firms can be grouped, they also have distinctive receptive capacities. That such differences are identifiable is important, for it provides a more nuanced account of SME behaviour than previously existed, particularly as it helps explain how and why SMEs respond differently. It helps explain why a one-size-fits-all approach to regulation may underperform, and provides a basis for re-evaluating how we think about regulation and potentially for reshaping approaches so they can better accommodate different rule-following behaviour.





The idea of what regulation means has evolved to embrace approaches far beyond the state’s more conventional boundaries. Confirmation of this is found in several multi-layered and decentralised concepts (e.g., regulatory capitalism, responsive regulation, smart regulation) that have attracted more than a soupçon of endorsement. Helpfully, Baldwin, Cave and Lodge (Baldwin et al. 2012) provide three interpretations of the term ‘regulation’, outlined below.

The first interpretation, ‘a specific set of commands’, is straightforward. This narrow formulation focuses on direct state measures to control any adverse side-effects of socially valuable behaviour by establishing legal standards and, if required, using enforcement techniques to ensure compliance. This command-and-control approach, which has been criticised for many reasons (Stewart 1985; 2000; Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; Baldwin et al. 2012), still dominates environmental agendas. A number of important regulatory programmes take the command-and-control approach, and these may involve obtaining permits and/or meeting specified standards. Even regulatory approaches like producer responsibility incorporate a central spine of command-based design mandates and prescriptions for materials standards, including bans on specific products. It is also important to keep in mind that forms of direct regulation are frequently of a more sophisticated nature than the old-style command-and-control approaches. Indeed, modern systems of integrated pollution prevention and control, for instance, incorporate anticipatory and precautionary requirements, while process-type standards like ‘best available techniques’ are flexible and allow the use of state-of-the-art technologies. Technology standards can thus be adaptable, and can be readily supplemented or supplanted with the availability of improved approaches to pollution control (Wagner 2000).

The second use, ‘a deliberate state influence’, suggests a broader, possibly less definable, set of regulatory arrangements, including those with economic or quasi-legal characteristics. It implies less (or indeed non-) coercive governmental approaches that try to engage other market and social actors. This broader interpretation seems to embrace alternative measures that over recent years have become more favourable to notions of trust-based regulation, smart regulation and new governance (Gunningham and Grabosky 1998; Delmas and Young 2009; Lange and Gouldson 2010). Such regulatory substitutes may include unilateral sector codes, negotiated codes, ratings systems, labelling, disclosure, subsidies and taxes etc (HM Government 2010). From an environmental perspective this has been an area of growth since the early 1990s, with such tools including environmental management systems (EMSs: e.g., ISO14001), agreements, positive and negative labelling and disclosure instruments, economic tools (e.g., landfill tax), codes, contractual powers, benchmarking, and social reporting mechanisms. The state can endorse these tools by encouraging and supporting their design and implementation.  It is important to note that these regulatory alternatives involve not only a very different governmental role, but they also draw upon different assumptions about the willingness of firms to attend to potential social and environmental harms.

The third and broadest interpretation is ‘all forms of social control and influence’. This embraces measures having the capacity to hold firms to account and which operate outside the state or legal sphere. Thus, and as recent discussions of the business and regulatory environment illustrate, constituents of civil or economic society are sources of ‘civil regulation’, owing to their capacity to influence organisational practices, networks and markets (Grabosky 2013; Vogel 2005, 2010; Gunningham et al. 2003). The proposed disposal by Shell UK of the Brent Spar oil platform, and the resulting high-profile Greenpeace campaign that led to considerable media coverage and mass boycotts, is a frequently-cited example (Grabosky 2013).











Micro	Fewer than 10		Under €2m		Under €2m

SMEs, we are frequently informed, are crucial for economic growth and development. It is widely reported that they comprise around 98-99%% of firms, and in Europe they are, for 2012, estimated to have accounted for 67% of employment and 58% of gross value added (Ecorys 2012). The news is not entirely positive, however. Although their environmental impact is difficult to assess due to lack of reliable evidence, caused primarily by the problem of assessing the effects of many small impacts which produce a large burden (Hillary 1995; Gunningham 2002), estimates suggest they produce around 64% of the industrial pollution in Europe, with sector variation generally being within the 60% to 70% range (Teknologist Institut 2010), and generate around 60% of commercial waste and 80% of pollution incidents in England and Wales (NetRegs 2005). 





From an environmental perspective, SMEs are often shown to be unresponsive (e.g., Williamson et al. 2006; Lynch-Wood and Williamson 2011; Tilley 1999; Revell and Rutherfoord 2003; Patton and Worthington 2003; Worthington and Patton 2005; Merritt 1998; Schaper 2002). This is usually attributed to internal and external factors related to firm size (Schaper 2002; Merritt 1998; Baylis et al. 1998; Rutherfoord et al. 2000), with the main internal factors being resources and owner-manager attitudes and the main external factor being a lack of stakeholder pressure. We will briefly consider each in turn.

The most obvious internal factor is lack of financial, human, or technological resources (Gunningham 2002; Lepoutre and Heene 2006; Noci and Verganti 1999; Hillary 2000). By restricting their ability to allocate human and financial capital, resource constraints are said to hinder the development of environmental improvements. Resource constraints may explain why SMEs have low awareness of environmental (including regulatory) issues, poor compliance records, underdeveloped strategies, and lack of receptiveness to eco-efficiency initiatives (Baylis et al. 1998; Wilson et al. 2011, 2012; Tilley 2000;  Hillary 2000; Schaper 2002; Côté et al. 2006; The Gallup Organisation 2011).

The mindset of owner-managers may hinder environment improvements or engagement in environmental initiatives. That owner-managers often feel their firms have negligible impacts (Rowe and Hollingsworth 1996; Simpson et al. 2004; Revell and Blackburn 2007; Petts et al. 1999; Hillary 2000) can be linked to owner-managers’ views that there is no justification for investing in environmental improvements (Revell and Rutherfoord 2003). Similarly, evidence suggests owner-managers are governed by market-based considerations that override environmental concerns (Williamson et al. 2006). And even where owner-managers display sympathetic attitudes, studies reveal an ‘attitude-practice’ gap where levels of performance rarely exceed compliance or satisfying basic efficiency measures (Rowe and Enticott 1998; Redmond et al. 2008; Tilley 1999; Worthington and Patton 2005; Schaper 2002, Petts et al. 1999).

External factors also influence firms. Firms’ stakeholders are an important source of pressure which, under certain conditions, can incite positive environmental responses (Vogel 2005; Gunningham et al. 2003). However, it is argued, and evidence suggests, that civil pressures are weak for SMEs, possibly because relevant stakeholders have little interest in, and create minimal pressure to improve, their social practices (Lynch-Wood and Williamson 2001, 2007; Thornton et al. 2009; Studer et al. 2008; Rowe and Enticott 1998; Revell and Blackburn 2004). Studies also show that there is little supply-chain pressure for SMEs to improve their environmental performance (Merritt 1998). Overall, this lack of stakeholder concern can have the effect of reducing the environment as a priority for smaller businesses (Revell and Blackburn 2004) and possibly explains why environmental reputation is less important for SMEs than larger firms (Graafland and Smid 2004).

The unresponsiveness of SMEs helps explain why regulation is often considered an important driver (Thornton et al. 2009; Williamson et al. 2006; Tilley 1999; Studer et al. 2006; Petts 2000; Bradford and Fraser 2008). That said, this is likely to be equated with SMEs seeking basic levels of compliance due to their lack of resources, which possibly explains why SMEs appear particularly vulnerable to noncompliance (Petts et al. 1999; see also Wilson et al. 2011). Coupled with limited stakeholder pressures, basic compliance through the allocation of minimally sufficient resources for legitimacy and peace of mind might appear to be a rational response.  Consequently, many SMEs are likely to function with varying degrees of risk of noncompliance, with breaches most probably resulting from a knowledge deficit. For similar reasons, SMEs will not go ‘beyond compliance’ by, say, installing unnecessary technologies or through voluntary activities.

Reviewing some of the evidence, Tilley (1999) observed a gap between the positive attitudes of smaller firms and reactive practices. In recognising the importance of regulation, she advocated a stronger regulatory framework. Tilley (2000) also found little support among SMEs for self-regulatory modes of governance. This mindset was evident in a study by Williamson et al. (2006), on account of the way market-based decision-making frames permeated daily practices and behaviour patterns. This was used to explain why ‘business performance’ and ‘regulation’ considerations drive behaviour, with regulation generally producing higher levels of activity. The authors suggest policies advocating voluntary practice are unlikely to have a major impact on SMEs.  This is supported by Studer et al. (2006), who show that SMEs are less inclined to engage in voluntary environmental activities than larger firms. SMEs prefer to wait for the certainty of impending legislation before taking actions. Petts (2000; see also, Petts et al. 1999), focused on ‘small’ and ‘medium’ SMEs, and used a mixed methodology of postal surveys, telephone interviews, and focus groups to canvass the views of managers and non-managers. Even though there was scepticism over the effectiveness of regulation and a lack of appreciation of the relevance of some regulatory requirements, the canvassed attitudes suggest that more traditional forms of regulation play an essential role by establishing capacity and maintaining imperatives for effective action within companies. Finally, Worthington and Patton (2005; see also, Patton and Worthington 2003) investigated the motivations underpinning the responses of UK screen-printers to the pressures to improve environmental performance. Their research concentrated on how far SME environmental responses went beyond compliance and reflected a strategic orientation on the part of managers so that possibilities for competitive advantage were realised.  The results confirmed the central role of regulation in shaping the responses of small firms.  They  suggest that although SMEs largely accepted that they had an adverse effect on the environment and recognised that there could be commercial benefits in taking action, their responses tended to be driven by (and limited to) compliance. Such responses were particularly prevalent among smaller SMEs, the majority of which regarded the advantages of environmental improvement to be outweighed by the costs.  While their findings show that larger SMEs are more likely to adopt beyond compliance measures, there was little evidence to suggest that environmental responses were motivated by a desire to exploit opportunities that would give firms a competitive edge.





SMEs are an important feature of the manufacturing sector. UK data suggest that at the start of 2011 there were 238,000 manufacturing firms, with SMEs comprising 57.1% and 33.1% of the sector’s employment and turnover respectively​[3]​. Alongside their economic importance it is also recognised, as indicated earlier, that SMEs have significant environmental impacts. We therefore investigated the environmental behaviour of SMEs associated with manufacturing. From 2004-2009, we conducted several studies that examined the environmental behaviour of SMEs​[4]​. While each was a separate study, they had identical core themes in terms of the type of information collected, the firms observed, and data analysis. The core theme can be summarised as involving an examination of the behaviour of SMEs, at least one face-to-face meeting with an owner-manager or equivalent senior person, and the interview lasting at least one hour, being recorded, and being semi-structured with the same core questions and prompts being employed, and the recorded information being transcribed and analysed inductively to identify recurrent themes.

The approach centred on ‘factual’ data and involved asking questions about concrete matters and events (e.g., ‘Has the firm been prosecuted?’). These enabled us to explore practices surrounding the facts (e.g., What happened following prosecution?). There were at least three justifications for this approach. First, it was important to capture, in the short timeframe in which each interview took place, as much information as possible due to the paucity of extant information on regulatory practices. Second, the provision of factual data provided an avenue into subsequent dialogue on relevant and surrounding issues. Third, the danger of social acceptability bias (from asking and working from direct factual questions) was recognised, but countered by engaging in post-question conversations that were determined by interviewees.  

The interview questions derived from our knowledge of regulation, understanding of business and regulatory literature, and experiences of researching SMEs. The questions were designed to elicit i) basic data on the firms themselves (e.g., turnover, employees); ii) information on different aspects of environment management and strategy (e.g., whether firms have environmental managers or policies); and iii) information on regulatory matters, broadly defined (e.g., whether firms have environmental permits or pay environmental taxes)​[5]​. This provided sufficient information to gain a broad view of the profiles of the firms and the degrees to which they are affected by different regulations. Each section, as well as eliciting facts, contained prompts to facilitate conversations around the facts. Also, unplanned prompts were used to allow conversations to follow paths set by interviewees.

All firms came from the West Midlands. Being the industrial heartland of the UK, the West Midlands was considered suitable for examination as the study’s focus was manufacturing SMEs. Of the 24,290 manufacturing firms in the West Midlands at the start of 2011, 24,145 were SMEs​[6]​. SMEs comprised around 99% of the region’s manufacturing firms, 42% of the regional sector’s turnover and over 61% of its employment.  A total of 600 SMEs from this population of manufacturing firms were randomly selected from business directories. The firms were telephoned a) to verify the sector b) to confirm the number of employees and c) to find out the contact details of the most senior person. Each firm was then sent a letter: outlining the aims of the study; requesting participation; and specifying it would involve an onsite interview. A follow-up call was made several days later to enquire whether the letter was received and if the relevant individual was willing to be interviewed.  While many firms were reluctant to be interviewed, 110 firms participated in the studies (27 medium, 54 small, 29 micro). Interviews, which lasted a minimum of one to three hours (and sometimes more when follow-up interviews were conducted), were recorded and subsequently transcribed.





Due to the data’s scope, our analysis focuses on what is typical. Tables are used to show the number of respondents offering comparable views, and are followed-up by a more detailed consideration of those views using appropriate examples from the text. All firms have been coded (i.e. medium firms are ‘Med-1’ to ‘Med-27’ etc).

LACK OF RESOURCES
A common grievance among respondents was lack of resources. During the interviews, 89 respondents said they lacked resources. The issue of scarce resources was raised in different contexts (e.g., rising costs) and was commonly presented in terms of ‘financial constraints’ due to low profit margins. One respondent said: “I have to account for every point zero, zero of a penny, that’s the type of price we work to” (med-3), while another reported: “I hardly have the resources to do what I’m doing at the moment. It’s obviously a very small company and the margins aren’t great” (sm-20). Scarce resources influenced firms’ environmental capabilities, with responses indicating, first, that they perceive their firms as having insufficient resources to deal effectively with environmental issues and, second, of not being prepared to allocate resources beyond that which was necessary. Describing his firm as a “tiny company”, a respondent said he did not have the “money to make environmental or those types of investments” (mic-29). Other respondents commented: “we don’t have the money or the time – this industry’s really bad and the environment’s not really a concern” (med-7); “there’s very little money about at the moment, there’s no way I can spend anything simply for the sake of the environment” (sm-5). Resource scarcity also included time, expertise and people. When discussing employees, the manager of a medium firm stated: “you need them to do their job and that’s what they do and so by taking people out or even educating... ....educating people takes time and training and sometimes you just can't afford to do it…They’re all tied up doing their jobs” (med-18), while a micro firm owner also said: “we don’t have anyone to do it and I think it would be difficult for anyone to find that sort of time” (mic-4).
 
RESOURCE DIFFERENCES
Resource differences can shape how firms prioritise tasks. Such differences are most obvious when considering employees; micro firms obviously have less human capital than small firms etc. The analysis also revealed that the turnovers of micro firms are generally smaller, and so on (Table 2). That said, differences in turnover were also evident within the categories shown in Table 2, in that, for example, micro firms with a turnover of less than £1m included firms with turnovers of £250,000, £600,000 and so forth. It was also evident that a firm with 4 employees could have a higher turnover than, say, a firm with 7 employees.  Thus, no matter what criteria are used to measure resource differences (e.g. technology employed, market share), the data indicate that differences will continue beyond any chosen categorisation.

Table 2: Size-turnover relationship





The consequence of resource differences materialises itself in many ways.  For example, environmental responsibilities differ in line with employee and turnover differences. As Table 3 shows, in smaller firms the responsibility for environmental issues tends to reside with owners or directors, whereas in larger firms it is often delegated. But as the Table also shows, there are variations within particular categories (e.g., small firms have ‘owner-manager’ and ‘delegated’ environmental responsibilities). However, care must be taken when interpreting data which shows that ‘owner-managers’ have environmental responsibilities. For example, in some smaller firms it was evident that respondents had given little thought to what this responsibility entailed: “I suppose I’d have to be wouldn’t I? Not really thought about that” (mic-17). Overall, Table 3 shows that although there are variations within the pattern, as firm size increases (in terms of employee numbers) the co-ordination of activities is more likely to involve more than one person.

Table 3: Co-ordinating responsibilities





	More than one person	2	22	14	






A further indicator of resource differences is time dedicated to environmental issues. When asked, responses ranged from ‘no time at all’ to ‘virtually all of my time’. Smaller firms typically spent less time, represented by the “as and when” response (e.g., “To be perfectly honest, very little really” (mic-3); “Probably not as much as I should do......it’s in the background” (mic-10)). In contrast, the manager of a medium size firm said: “I’d say about 50% of my time at the moment” (med-9).

COMPLIANCE ORIENTATIONS










It is difficult to interview firms that openly confess to noncompliance. But for one firm, the owner was explicit about his approach: “I suppose it’s not perfectly correct, but from a common sense point of view it’s more efficient for me to drop that off at waste tip as I go past, than to send a big lorry up here once a week to collect it” (mic-14). When prompted, this interviewee said: “it’s common sense as opposed to regulation. I ignore the rules because they’re stupid”. However, the interviewee said he would try to comply with measures he considered legitimate or where he could associate with the risk: “if regulations say you’ve got to set up scaffolding so it’s safe, then that’s common sense, so yes. But if they say ‘....it’s toxic material and if you get it on your hands it could go through your skin and give you dermatitis probably in a thousand years time’, we’ll tend not bother so much with that.” In addition, the respondent suggested he would comply if he was forced to: “We’d try to abide by some laws if we had to, if we felt we’d be caught.” This was said in a context where the respondent had no contact with a regulator, of any sort.

When we discussed economic instruments, the respondent says his priority is avoidance – “I won’t pay it, simple” – but says that if forced to pay them he would have to absorb the costs. The respondent was equally unenthusiastic about alternative ‘self-regulatory’ measures: “it’s the biggest con job that was ever perpetrated.... ISO14001….. How many forests have been cut down to make the bloody paper? How many man hours have been wasted?” 

While this is only one firm, it highlights a complex problem. Even though there is an orientation towards noncompliance, this can be accompanied by more than one type of behavioural characteristic and more than one regulatory response. For this firm, command-based measures will work if they are considered legitimate, and if they are seen to be enforced. In line with this posture, the respondent is unlikely to self-regulate. 

Natural Compliance
Most firms are natural compliers, in that compliance is their primary motivation. These firms aim to do neither less nor more than the law requires. The following responses typify this approach: “if there were environmental regulations then first and foremost we’d have to comply with them. That’s always the first prerequisite” (med-13); “to be on the right side of the law, so we’re covering ourselves basically” (sm-38). Different reasons were provided to justify this. Some respondents sought compliance as they felt it was the right thing to do: “the management….do care about the environment, and they’re applying their sort of ideology into the company by trying to get everything right within the law” (med-25). Others expressed stronger environmental values, but indicated these were overridden by commercial pressures: “I personally did have quite a strong environmentally-friendly ethos, but survival has kind of taken over” (sm-54).

Natural compliers, however, exhibited different behaviours. Some could be described as vulnerable natural compliers as they were unsure if they were fully compliant. Particularly, some firms were uncertain whether they were compliant across all areas: “Reality is we don’t really know…I’ve got a good idea of what we should be doing, but I don’t really know, if that makes sense” (med-11); “all those things probably affect us, but by how much, I have to admit, we’re unsure. We do our best to understand what they are, but as an honest admission we probably don’t meet some of the requirements” (mic-26).  Vulnerability was more pronounced for some firms than others; six (35%) medium firms admitted compliance vulnerability, compared to 30 (75%) small and 19 (86%) micro firms. 

By contrast, some firms exhibited considerable knowledge of regulation, with the respondent from one firm with an environmental permit saying: “Yes, I’m confident we know what we’re doing. We’ve invested a lot to get it right – I could show you around if you like” (sm-5).  In line with these variations in natural compliance behaviour, there were firms that were not vulnerable across all areas of activity. Indeed, there were areas where compliance was more assured, such as where there was guidance on compliance through the supply chain: “We’ve been working with [customers] on the ROHS compliance stuff and they know exactly what they’re doing. That’s really helpful because they pass that on” (sm-44); “[customers] always know….what’s in the pipeline. And they have to let us know otherwise we can’t comply with what they have to comply with” (sm-19). Similarly, some firms received help from support networks: “We’ve had quite a lot of dealing with [person] from Groundwork. They’ve worked with us quite closely and I think we’re fairly safe. I mean there’s legislation that we’re possibly not complying with or perhaps we‘re not aware of but, having had a third party come in and have a look at our processes, we don’t have significant problems” (med-11). Another interviewee said: “We did a lot more work last year, as I said I did send a couple of members of staff on some training courses [local environmental business network] had done. It was on packaging and dealing with our hazardous waste and other stuff we had to do. We did learn a lot from that. But God knows we haven’t put it all into practice, because of time restraints…I decided to join that because I can see the increasing environmental legislation and it’s impacting on us in quite a lot” (med-3).

It is interesting to also note that smaller SMEs are seldom involved with wider networks. For smaller firms, assistance often comes from basic information sources and networks that are not environment-specific. For example: “To be honest I don’t think I am fully aware of all of them [the regulations], but Business Link organisation and the local Chamber of Commerce send out newsletters with news about some of them and I tend to quickly sift through it all and make a judgement as to whether it’s likely to be important to us because there’s such a lot of it passes over my desk” (mic-47). 

Having identified some characteristics associated with natural compliers, the analysis considered how these types of firms interacted with different forms of regulation. Since natural compliers are compliance orientated, they will, as we might expect, attempt to respond to a range of command-based measures relating to, say, waste disposal, oil storage, and packaging: “When I have the hazardous waste to dispose of then the waste disposal company takes care of the paperwork and I just have to sign the forms that they send me....” (mic-20). Moreover, a small number of natural compliers were affected by more onerous permitting requirements, and had tried to ensure compliance by putting in place the necessary procedures and technologies. One respondent, whose firm operated a permitted chemical process, said: “We’ve got to do it, simple. We’ve had things like the ground surveys, the emissions modelling and this, that and the other done.  I don’t think it’ll force us to do anything other than what we’re doing now. It’ll just cost us money” (sm-5). Another firm had invested £750,000 to install a new boiler in compliance with its permitted process: “The costs of IPPC already are so high. Just to apply for, we spent…I don’t know, well many thousands of pounds just to apply. You know we spent a heck of a lot improving our emission side and the abatement – to comply” (med-15).

When considering economic instruments, such as taxes and charges (e.g., landfill tax, climate change levy), the emerging picture is that natural compliers tend simply to absorb the costs or pass those costs on to customers.  Thus, there is very little evidence of firms investing in technical or process changes to reduce, say, waste or energy costs. Where there is evidence of a response to economic instruments, they tend to be modest: e.g., “Everything’s switched off, the lights and the machines everybody works on. We have compressors as well. That uses it down here. I think they come on as and when we use them with a unit that’s attached to them” (sm-33). The data indicated that there were three reasons for the lack of a more strategic response to economic instruments. First, firms regard the costs as insignificant: “We’ve a couple of skips a week that we fill and replace but it hasn’t had a major effect on us at all. [Unplanned prompt: And energy?] The levy? We’re just on the threshold where it didn’t really affect us too greatly” (med-2); “it’s just absorbed. I wouldn’t say it has affected prices very much….I suppose the landfill tax has made it more difficult to get rid of waste. But the amount of waste I produce....it hasn’t really affected me very much” (mic-20). Second, and in line with some of the points made above, firms say they do not have the resources to make more substantial efficiency gains to offset cost increases: “I’d like combined heat power generators, but can’t afford. Very nice, but you know? [Unplanned prompt: It hasn’t forced you to rethink then?] No. When the...levy came about I did a report to the directors explaining that this is going to have an impact; it’s going to cost the company more. It’s like ‘ok, it costs us more’. I can’t do anything about it, just pay it” (med-3). Third, the environment is seen to be competing with other more important issues: “just simple absorption. I think any small business has a whole host of things that need looking at and number one is getting goods out the door; keeping customers happy, good customer service, dealing with quality issues and making a profit”(sm-42).

The data also revealed that natural compliers are not normally responsive to self-regulatory mechanisms. For example, for some firms there was, at best, only a limited awareness of self-regulatory mechanisms, be they EMSs or environment labels. When prompted on measures such as ISO 14001 and EMAS, one respondent said: “The only ISO I’ve ever heard of is 9000. Not heard of the others” (sm-13), while another respondent said “I might have heard of it sort of in conversation, but I’m not really aware of it in any great detail” (sm-2). Also, when prompted on whether they had considered EMS accreditation, most natural compliers answered negatively. As the following quotations suggest, the reasons for this are a lack of pressure and resources, and, to lesser extent, the fact that they were unconvinced of the worth of an EMS:

“[Water Company] did ask us about ISO14001 once I think [Prompt: Would that be the driver?] I think it would, definitely...... [Prompt: Do you feel you’d get commercial advantage from having it?] No. .... I think the commercial aspects is what it comes down to at the end of the day, which is the price, the quality of the products and the service” (med-12).

“I haven’t had any real pressure.  I’ve been asked on occasions whether we’ve got it or are working towards it but as far as accreditation goes whether it's 14001 or anything else I don’t go for accreditation.....I don’t see the value of  the certificates unless I’m forced” (med-3).

“for companies our size I think a lot of the standards are just complete nonsense. What actually changes? You know you’ll get dozens… of companies that have got ISO14000.... They can’t deliver anything on time” (sm-23).

It is also interesting that, being natural compliers, these types of firms would be prepared to implement an EMS if forced to by law: “I haven’t got plans to....if it was necessary I would” (sm-16); “Maybe in the future if there are regulations that we would need to comply with” (sm-34). 

This short review again highlights a complex regulatory problem.  There is a large group of firms exhibiting naturally compliant behaviour, but the reasons for and outcomes of this behaviour vary. A well-resourced naturally compliant firm, say, will be able to support its orientation differently than one which is less well-resourced. Simultaneously, the reasons for seeking to be naturally compliant will vary even when firms have similar levels of resource (e.g., those that comply for fear of the enforcement and those because they think it morally correct). Alongside this, the extent that firms can be described as naturally compliant will vary. Some are archetypal natural compliers, while others have sufficient characteristics that enable us to describe them as natural compliers. A factor that seems important to natural compliers is that they very much rely, to varying extents, on others – or trusted networks – for help and assistance in terms of guiding their decision-making on non-core (i.e. profit orientated) activities. This may be because they do not have the resources, and inclination, to individually engage with non-core decision-making activities. 

Strategic Compliance 
Some firms go beyond compliance for strategic reasons. For example, a firm may adopt an EMS because it believes it will improve or safeguard its competitive position. To varying degrees, strategic compliers take a planned and proactive view of regulation, sometimes building in a margin of safety. As one respondent said: “any future or planned projects are always assessed to make sure they meet current law. [Prompt: do you go beyond your license requirement?] We certainly are, yeah.......Like I say, we’ve been very proactive because of the nature of firm we are” (Med-9). Clearly, strategic compliers were instrumental rather than altruistic. They either seek to identify with or exploit market opportunities for good environmental behaviour or, more typically, safeguard their positions by reducing risk. Furthermore, strategic responses differ across and within firms. Firms may exceed compliance in some areas, but not others. They might exceed compliance where it makes strategic sense to them, and conversely, will not do so when there is no strategic imperative. Strategic compliers are clearly sensitive to legal rules, and changes in the law, and often devote considerable resources to fully understand and implement what the law requires. The Environmental Manager of a firm with ISO14001 and an environmental permit said: “there’s a budget for environmental matters and environmental improvements......I would say most of that money....has gone into what you might classify as prevention of pollution....the permit requirements” (med-5).   This included developing the necessary skills to deal with legal issues:  “people who work on the plant do know what’s what. There’s a wide range of knowledge here” (med-14): “I’ve done energy efficiency training as part of our drive to continuous improvements” (med-5).

When we considered economic instruments, it was clear that strategic compliers can absorb the costs or use those costs as a trigger for investing in new technologies or procedures. As with natural compliers, where these types of firms absorbed the costs, it was typically because the costs had limited impact.  However, unlike natural compliers, there was evidence that where they anticipated that costs would continue to increase, they would make the necessary investments. As one respondent said: “…the efficiency of the machinery has improved. We’ve had new machines in as well.  We’ve got various meters around the sites. We have meters for each kiln that we read separately” (med-14).

In addition to proactively responding to regulation and economic instruments, some strategic compliers demonstrated beyond compliance practices. Some, for instance, adopt EMSs. There were many reasons for this.  It could be to satisfy the requirements of existing or potential customers, to reduce risk arising from not having appropriate compliance systems in place, or to reduce compliance costs. This is seen in the following responses:

“We’re a reasonably big company and we extract stuff from quarries..... As I said, we’re monitored by the local authority and we sort of felt that we needed to go for ISO14001 because of that. And we have been asked in inverted commas if we’ve got it on more than one occasion.” (med-14)

 “...it was a sort of a requirement from one of our major customers. It was something we’d been looking at for a while but [large firm] is quite a big customer and it was really something that they were really quite keen on us doing.” (sm-15)

“We’re a fairly big company and licensed process and there’s risk involved. And there’s some scoring system....It's quite interesting. One of the questions on that form is ‘Have you got ISO 140001?’  It's obviously designed to actually push companies down that road. The way it works I think is that if you've got 14001 then you’d be able to tick all the boxes that said yes for all the other things on the form. All the control factors, because you’d have the procedures and all the controls in place. So obviously looking at that and looking at the future it’s fairly apparent that you've got to go down that road anyway. Because that scoring system – the lower you score obviously the less you pay so it’s quite a big incentive to meet the requirements.” (med-1)

Lastly, the data show that firms with EMSs were also more likely to report on their activities. Several larger SMEs, for example, reported and audited their activities, although levels of auditing differed across firms. When one respondent was asked if his firm produced a report, he said: “Yes, internally. It goes to the management review board.... we have a third party assessment audit, which is biannual, and we do our own internal environmental audit, which tends to be once a year” (med-9).

Again, we see strategic compliers exhibiting different behaviours. Perhaps the most important result of this analysis is that you cannot simply assume that a firm with, say, an EMS is automatically a strategic player or that it will be strategic in everything it does. What is certain, though, is that there is a sufficient range of activities that are proactively undertaken and sufficiently resourced, and that there is a commitment to seeing them properly undertaken.





This study has examined how manufacturing SMEs respond to regulation. Generally speaking, the data support previous work in showing that regulation is an important, in all probability the most important, driver of behaviour. For SMEs, traditional command-style regulatory rules signify the beginning and end of their responsibilities. Alongside this, SMEs are generally unlikely to adopt self-regulatory environmental approaches, or to respond to voluntary instruments, and so we must be careful when designing programmes for this purpose. But this is not to say that voluntary approaches have no place in a regulatory toolkit: they will for some.  The reason for this is that we can observe a more nuanced arrangement, since, without undermining the general view that regulation drives behaviour, the data show that different types of regulation affect firms in different ways, and different types of firms will engage with different types of regulation in different ways and for different reasons.  This, we believe, is something that has not been captured with sufficient sophistication in many studies, which have tended to over generalize. Another distinct contribution to our understanding is the finding that many SMEs, because they are reluctant (or unable) to deploy scarce resources to environmental issues, rely upon the knowledge of others to inform and direct their strategic decision-making on regulated activities. This requires that they trust the sources from which the information is provided, with the data showing, for this sample of SMEs, that these include trade associations, chambers of commerce, non-governmental support agencies, suppliers, customers, and informal business contacts. Developing trusted networks could therefore be a particularly effective way of managing the implementation of state regulation for many SMEs. To be sure, this will require further research as it is clear that a trusted network is not a ‘one size fits all’ entity. It is likely to be quite specific in terms of its constituency and mode of operation, and, from this, can be said to require ground level facilitation rather than top down direction.

In trying to understand SMEs, our analysis identifies two factors which, when combined, seem to determine whether and how firms respond. The first is ‘capability’, a composite measure comprising resources, employees, technologies, knowledge, etc. Capabilities, as shown, differ across firms; and size, while a valuable proxy, does not by itself determine capability. That said, as we might expect, the data suggest larger SMEs generally have higher turnovers and a greater range of skills and technologies than their smaller counterparts. Such characteristics seem to materially affect what firms can do.  A firm must have the resource capabilities to respond, say, to a complex permitting regime or management system. But the data show that capability alone cannot determine responses, otherwise we would be unable to observe how firms of similar capabilities respond differently, or how a firm with less capability may outperform one with seemingly greater capability. The reason, and the second factor, is orientation and the way orientation influences how firms deploy resources.  Orientation is linked to, but independent of, capability. This is why larger firms are generally going to be more proactive than smaller firms (i.e., capacity-orientation-relationship), even though there are instances where the reverse is true (i.e., capacity-orientation-independence). But the crucial point is that organisational responses are better understood by considering capability and orientation. This combination enables us to envisage firms with different regulatory receptive capacities, where receptive capacity can be conceived as constituting a regulatory and compliance culture. 

The overall schema, for example, has identified a large population of firms that are natural compliers, but which nevertheless have their own unique characteristics; i.e., they want to comply for different reasons and are able to comply in different ways due to their different capabilities. Thus, not only are there populations of firms showing similar patterns of behaviour, but there are further levels of difference within these populations. There are, for example, sub-populations (eg safe natural compliers, vulnerable natural compliers, well resourced natural compliers, poorly resourced natural compliers) etc. Ultimately, we come to the individual firm itself, which will have a unique receptive capacity: a particular orientation and capacity to support this orientation.

While it is generally true to say SMEs are driven by regulation, it is a view that is imperfect. And while certain firms share sufficient similarities that we cluster them, such clusters nevertheless fail to tell the full story. There are also different types of firms within each cluster. Having sufficient commonality that we are able to group firms – and, simultaneously, recognising that you cannot treat firms as all being the same within those groups – poses a set of complex regulatory problems. It does, however, help to explain why a one-size-fits-all approach to compliance or enforcement will not work and why specific regulatory measures and approaches may underperform. Since firms have different receptive capacities (or capacities and orientations), it is unlikely one measure will be received with equal receptivity. Moreover, it helps us to see how reshaping approaches, so they can better accommodate different rule-following behaviour, may be important. Given that we have a total population of firms, groups of firms within that population with shared characteristics, sub populations, and individual firms within each group with difference characteristics, then it becomes clear that the task facing regulation is to be able to simultaneously regulate the population of firms, the groups within that population, and the individuals within those groups.  
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